If you’ve heard of Naomi Oreskes, it may have been because of the 2011 book she co-authored with Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Climate Change. In that book, Oreskes and Conway explored the industry-driven misinformation campaigns around tobacco and climate change, including the scientists who helped with those efforts. In 2019, Oreskes turned her attention to the question, “Why trust science?”, in a book of the same title.
Why Trust Science? is based on two lectures Oreskes gave as part of Princeton University’s Tanner Lectures on Human Values in late 2016: “Why Trust Science? Perspectives from the History and Philosophy of Science” and “Science Awry.”
At that time four others were invited to give responses from their perspectives in different fields, including:
- Susan Lindee, Professor of History and Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania
- Marc Lange, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina
- Ottmar Edenhofer, Economist, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
- Jon A. Krosnick, Professor of Communication, Political Science and Psychology, Stanford University
Each of their responses is included in part two of the book. Edenhofer’s response is co-authored by Martin Kowarsch from the Mercator Research Institute. The last part of the book (chapter 7) is Oreskes’ response to the four commentaries.
Oreskes started with three examples in which the science is agreed on, but the public is less certain: vaccinations, evolution, and anthropogenic climate change — asking how the public can trust the science. Exploring the history of the philosophy of science, she discussed reasoning that evolved over time, including ideologies focused on scientific methodology, the sociology of science, the roles of feminism and diversity in the collective accomplishments of science, consensus and a consideration of conflicts of interest. In the second chapter, Oreskes focused on examples when science was wrong, asking if science is sometimes spectacularly wrong, how can we know that what we understand as a result of science today is correct. To address this, she discussed limited energy theory, rejection of continental drift, eugenics, the association between hormonal birth control and depression, and dental floss. In a coda for section one, Oreskes synthesized and summarized the main conclusions of the two lectures, including a discussion of why it is important for scientists to acknowledge and express their values even though this is counter to how scientists traditionally report science.
Part two of the book included the four commentaries on Oreskes’ position. Lindee focused on building trust in science through the everyday science that people use without realizing it. Lange focused on the circularity of science when pointing to the peer-review process (“experts vouching for other experts”) and the notion that it is easier to vindicate specific issues within science as opposed to the entire scientific enterprise because the notion of self-correction is singularly specific to individual ideas rather than to the scientific enterprise at large. Edenhofer and Kowarsch focused on Pascal’s Wager, that is considering the relative risk of being incorrect when taking different positions into account. In this way, they focused on the distinction between science and policies based on science, positing that different values should be presented with science when a policy consideration is involved. Finally, Krosnick focused on issues with reproducibility in science, citing specific examples. He also discussed professional pressures that could amplify reproducibility issues, encouraging the scientific community to address these concerns as a way of increasing trust in science.
In part three, Oreskes responded to each of the commentaries. While she agreed with some points, she further clarified her position on others. Perhaps her harshest response was to Krosnick’s concerns due to his use of individual papers as examples of findings that couldn’t be reproduced. This caused Oreskes to remind readers of the points made about trusting science. Specifically, science results from consensus among a diverse group of scientists acting as a self-critical community, and that means our understanding comes not from a single paper but from a body of scientific work.
Contributed by: Charlotte A. Moser
If you’ve heard of Naomi Oreskes, it may have been because of the 2011 book she co-authored with Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Climate Change. In that book, Oreskes and Conway explored the industry-driven misinformation campaigns around tobacco and climate change, including the scientists who helped with those efforts. In 2019, Oreskes turned her attention to the question, “Why trust science?”, in a book of the same title.
Why Trust Science? is based on two lectures Oreskes gave as part of Princeton University’s Tanner Lectures on Human Values in late 2016: “Why Trust Science? Perspectives from the History and Philosophy of Science” and “Science Awry.”
At that time four others were invited to give responses from their perspectives in different fields, including:
- Susan Lindee, Professor of History and Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania
- Marc Lange, Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina
- Ottmar Edenhofer, Economist, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research
- Jon A. Krosnick, Professor of Communication, Political Science and Psychology, Stanford University
Each of their responses is included in part two of the book. Edenhofer’s response is co-authored by Martin Kowarsch from the Mercator Research Institute. The last part of the book (chapter 7) is Oreskes’ response to the four commentaries.
Oreskes started with three examples in which the science is agreed on, but the public is less certain: vaccinations, evolution, and anthropogenic climate change — asking how the public can trust the science. Exploring the history of the philosophy of science, she discussed reasoning that evolved over time, including ideologies focused on scientific methodology, the sociology of science, the roles of feminism and diversity in the collective accomplishments of science, consensus and a consideration of conflicts of interest. In the second chapter, Oreskes focused on examples when science was wrong, asking if science is sometimes spectacularly wrong, how can we know that what we understand as a result of science today is correct. To address this, she discussed limited energy theory, rejection of continental drift, eugenics, the association between hormonal birth control and depression, and dental floss. In a coda for section one, Oreskes synthesized and summarized the main conclusions of the two lectures, including a discussion of why it is important for scientists to acknowledge and express their values even though this is counter to how scientists traditionally report science.
Part two of the book included the four commentaries on Oreskes’ position. Lindee focused on building trust in science through the everyday science that people use without realizing it. Lange focused on the circularity of science when pointing to the peer-review process (“experts vouching for other experts”) and the notion that it is easier to vindicate specific issues within science as opposed to the entire scientific enterprise because the notion of self-correction is singularly specific to individual ideas rather than to the scientific enterprise at large. Edenhofer and Kowarsch focused on Pascal’s Wager, that is considering the relative risk of being incorrect when taking different positions into account. In this way, they focused on the distinction between science and policies based on science, positing that different values should be presented with science when a policy consideration is involved. Finally, Krosnick focused on issues with reproducibility in science, citing specific examples. He also discussed professional pressures that could amplify reproducibility issues, encouraging the scientific community to address these concerns as a way of increasing trust in science.
In part three, Oreskes responded to each of the commentaries. While she agreed with some points, she further clarified her position on others. Perhaps her harshest response was to Krosnick’s concerns due to his use of individual papers as examples of findings that couldn’t be reproduced. This caused Oreskes to remind readers of the points made about trusting science. Specifically, science results from consensus among a diverse group of scientists acting as a self-critical community, and that means our understanding comes not from a single paper but from a body of scientific work.
Contributed by: Charlotte A. Moser